Index / Företag / Flydubai flyg poster - de läckta dokumenten

Share This Post

Företag

Flydubai flyg poster - de läckta dokumenten

Piloter beskriver händelser, inklusive ett bombhot, fågelkollisioner, misstag som orsakas av trötthet och missbruk av passagerare Flydubai svar på läckta dokument Ryska räddningstjänsten på platsen av en Flydubai krasch i Rostov-on-Don i mars. Foto:

Advertisement

Piloter beskriver händelser, inklusive ett bombhot, fågelkollisioner, misstag som orsakas av trötthet och missbruk av passagerare

Flydubai svar på läckta dokument

Flydubai flyg poster - de läckta dokumenten

Ryska räddningstjänsten på platsen av en Flydubai krasch i Rostov-on-Don i mars.
Foto: Reuters

De Flydubai flygsäkerhets rapporter läckt till The Guardian täcker alla typer av incidenter och missöden som registrerats av piloter under mars och april i år.

Detta är ett urval av sina rapporter, som har förkortade i vissa fall. Meningarna i fetstil har uppmärksammats av The Guardian.

De felstavningar är som de visas i dokumenten; Engelska är det språk som används av piloter, men det är inte nödvändigtvis en pilot modersmål.

I alla de rapporter inkluderar 42 klagomål om eller erfarenhet av trötthet; 25 fågelkollisioner; 10 medicinska akutfall; fem laser incidenter; ett bombhot; en "hundar på banan", och ett instabilt flygplan på grund av instabila tryffel.

The Guardian sätta de farhågor som piloterna till Flydubai.

Flygbolaget sade att det hade utvecklat en "skylla fri" arbetskultur för att tillåta piloter att höja oro.

"Oron kring arbetstidsscheman och trötthet har höjts som en del av säkerhetsrapporteringsmekanismen öppen och hur liten andel vi tar dem alla lika allvarligt", sade en talesman.

"Systemet är utformat för att uppmuntra piloterna att rapportera alla säkerhetsproblem så fort som möjligt.

"Flydubai har aldrig och skulle aldrig be besättningen att arbeta utanför lagligt tillåtna timmar. Alla flygningar är planerade inom lagliga gränser.

"Vi har utvecklat ett omfattande verksamhetssystem med säkerhet i centrum. Våra riktlinjer, rutiner och kontrollsystem tillämpas för varje operativ funktion av våra flygbolag. De finns att ge våra besättningar med en säker, reglerad ram för att hjälpa dem att möta sina roller. "

akronymer

NCC Network besättningsstyrning

FMS flygövervakningssystem

SCCM kabinbesättningsmedlem

OM-A Drifthandbok A

ATC Flygledning

RWY Runway

SOP standardförfarande

Andra officer

FDP flygtjänstperioden

ASR Flygsäkerhet rapport

bombhot

512 DXB-IEV

Dubai till Kiev, Ukraina

Mindre än en timme innan den når våra mål i Kiev, kom ledande till sittbrunnen och informerat oss om en passagerare som hade berättade en medlem av kabinpersonalen att han hade en bomb ombord. Ledande veta att situationen hade inträffat när kabinpersonalen hade vägrat att betjäna passageraren mer alkohol eftersom han började bli för berusad och blev aggressiv.

Det blev ganska uppenbart att han troligen inte hade en bomb, men vi naturligtvis inte vill ta några chanser (han var ryska, vi bara in Ukraina, var han mycket verbala om att vara Putins anhängare - gör matematik! ), så vi kallade NCC genast.

Besättningen började söka checklista bomb enligt OM-A utan resultat. Vi beslutade att hålla låg profil med situationen ombord för att undvika panik.

Vid landning i Kiev, ATC berättade att parkera på taxi vägen, och på denna punkt jag informerade passagerarna sitta kvar eftersom vi inte hade nått vår parkeringsläge. Vi visste vad de lokala myndigheterna planen var i detta skede, men jag kommunicerar direkt med flygplatspolisen från cockpit fönstret. Vi var förmodligen väntar på 30 minuter på taxi sätt med mycket lite information.

Det enda de berättade för mig var att vi inte fick gå i land tills "specialstyrkor" kom på scenen. Det är rimligt att säga att hela situationen verkade väldigt oprofessionellt och oorganiserad på deras del, eftersom vi väntade på en så lång tid, och som jag sa till dem - om vi verkligen hade en bomb på våra flygplan, jag ville få min passagerare off ASAP.

De informerades NCC åtminstone 30 minuter innan vi landade även i Kiev, och ändå, vi väntade så länge. Passagerarna var naturligtvis att bli otålig och upprörd, eftersom de inte visste vad som pågick, så jag bestämde mig för att göra ett tillkännagivande där jag berättade för dem att det var en "säkerhetstillbud", och att vi väntade flygplatsansvariga. Jag ville inte ljuga, men jag ville också undvika att använda ordet "bomb".

Slutligen hade efter ungefär 200 säkerhet och militära personlig omgiven flygplanet i en mycket dramatisk herrgård, den var redo att komma ombord. De ville att evakuera passagerarna, men på denna punkt jag var tvungen att vägra, eftersom hela situationen var att få en lite löjligt. Som jag sa till dem, hade vi suttit på taxi väg i över 30 minuter - om det hade funnits en bomb ombord, skulle det sannolikt ha detonerat redan !!

Jag ville inte att orsaka panik och eventuella skador på mina passagerare, så jag insisterade på en normal landstigning efter mannen avlägsnades av polisen. Efter alla passagerare hade lämnat flygplanet, vi gjorde en grundlig bomb sökning med bomben truppen (tekniska avdelningar mm kontrollerades av FO).

Inga fynd, men ganska en fördröjning.

Trötthet en pilot säkerhet berör 354 LYP-DXB
Faisalabad, Pakistan, till Dubai

Senior sova under flygning i en business class!

Under kryssning skede, innan jag kom ut ur cockpit för fysiskt behov, var det kommit till min kännedom genom besättningsmedlem som Senior sov i business class-fåtölj. Jag begärde omedelbart en av besättningen att väcka honom, senare var han åter observeras genom säkerhet kameran sova på hoppet sätet. Efter landningen var ledande utfrågad.

382 URKK-OMBD
Krasnodar, Ryssland, till Dubai

Flygningen var början försenat från Dubai på grund av ombordstigning och ATC. Lyckades få några genvägar och anlände till KRR några minuter tidigare. Flygplan tankades och inspekterades inom 20 minuter efter ankomsten konstaterades att flygplanets vingar skulle behöva avisning på grund av kyla blöt bränsle frost. FZ markpersonal på KRR informerade kaptenen av en avvisas passagerare, berättade att de skulle ta ungefär 10 minuter att bearbeta och skulle sedan skickas ut till flygplanet, i detta skede detta inte verkar motiverar någon oro för att fördröja flygningen. 1 avvisas passagerare blev sedan två och slutligen 4. Det var ganska uppenbart att den första 10 minuters uppskattning var vilt felaktig och att flygningen skulle kraftigt försenat väntar passagerarna.

Under fördröjningen 2 kvinnliga passagerare som kallas CCM via knappen besättningen samtalet de klagade den mångkulturella mix av besättningen och sade "varför inte finns fler ryska besättningen på flyget? Besättningsmedlemmen bad passagerarna att uppträda, de var klart berusad och inte lyssna. Passagerarna då kallas CCM och muntligt (racially) misshandlade henne, berätta för henne att @ # $% ^ &.

Cockpit fick kännedom om situationen genom SCM, kaptenen valde att avlasta passagerarna i ljuset av deras berusade tillstånd och verbala övergrepp av besättningen. Under ovanstående fördröjning kaptenen talar också med NCC som det blev uppenbart cockpit och troligen kabinpersonalen skulle vara att gå in på diskretion. Mot bakgrund av längden av den ursprungliga tullen, tidpunkten för rapporten, besättningens vila, efterföljande planerade arbetsuppgifter och stress ombord situationer enades som en besättning som vi inte gärna gå in på diskretion. Kaptenen hade många samtal med NCC förklara situationen ännu NCC hålls med hjälp av orealistiska tidsinställningar och beräkningar som inte baserades på fakta från KRR. NCC tycktes ha en misstro mot informationen flygdäck och hålls ber att tala med FZ markpersonal som upprepade samma information vidare från cockpit. Markpersonalen var exceptionellt upptagen med flera frågor och att vara ständigt kallas och avbryts av NCC var föga hjälpsamt och förvärrat förseningarna. Det är osäkert och föga för bemanning att ständigt be besättningen att gå in på diskretion särskilt efter besättningen har sagt att de inte känner sig trygga att fortsätta till diskretion. När besättningen har gjort ett uttalande att de inte är säkert att gå in på diskretion det bör ses som satt i sten och inte något att försöka nagga på! Ingen vill orsaka ytterligare förseningar, störningar och hamna på ett ut station. Om vi kände säkert att fortsätta till Dubai skulle vi ha gjort det! Flygningen så småningom avgick 1h 43mins sent, med besättningen överens om att kvitta för Dubai men att veta att vi skulle vara mest sannolikt att avleda till Kuwait. Det blev snart uppenbart att vår första bedömning var korrekt och man kom överens om att vi skulle avleda till Kuwait, detta ändrades till Doha efter NCC uppmanade SATCOM att säga att det inte fanns några platser tillgängliga från Kuwait under 8 timmar. NCC kallas flygplanet SAT telefon ungefär 4 gånger under flygningen med det senaste samtalet görs efter särskilt bett att inte kalla längre som vi var mycket upptagen och det var en oönskad distraktion, de ombads att skicka ett ACARS budskap att kommunicera om det behövs .

Under det senaste samtalet NCC frågade igen för oss att fortsätta på till Dubai trots besättningen anger flera gånger innan de fördelnings eftersom de inte känner sig säkra att fortsätta! Det är oacceptabelt att utöva påtryckning, men positivt det är gjort, försöker söta prata en besättning för att göra något som de har sagt att de känner är osäker är unprofessionally och extremt farligt! Vi anlände till Doha 0812 drygt en timme in på diskretion. Den KRR besättningen lättad av stby besättningen på cirka 0945. Den totala tull var 16 timmar 09mins.

390 DXB-JED Dubai till Jeddah, Saudiarabien

Rapporterade trött för tull, på grund av trötthet till följd av tilldelad roster.

405 DXB-KBL Dubai till Kabul, Afghanistan

Väntade på marken med passagerare ombord från cirka 09:00 till 17:00 på grund av mark förseningar och allmän oordning från ramp personlig. Utan tillräckligt med mat och vatten vi försvars passagerarna. Crew kontroll planerad mig för en annan flygning som oundvikligen kommer att gå in i diskretion. Jag var trött, hungrig och olämpliga för extra plikt. Jag gick hem trött.

418 DXB-KBL Dubai till Kabul

Från tid till annan har jag svårt att sova på grund av min kropp klocka ständigt förändras på grund av mängden av växlar från dag till nattflygningar Jag har utsatts för under de senaste 4 åren eller mer. Jag kan producera mina listor om det behövs. Jag kunde inte sova innan min 301 tull, även om jag hade varit upp sedan 0515 på morgonen, och gick till sängs på runt 06:00 redo för min 0320 rapport. Med tanke på säkerheten anses jag det är bättre att inte arbeta i en trött / trött tillstånd. Detta var inte en fråga om taktisk sjukdom, men en verklig händelse av att inte kunna sova, och de säkerhetsmässiga konsekvenserna av att fungera ett flygplan i ett olämpligt tillstånd. I detta skede jag tror inte att jag behöver besöka en AME, men om det fortsätter bortom min ledighet jag kommer att samråda med styrelserna avdelningar flydubai.

XXXXX Dubai till Muscat, Oman

Jag var planerad att flyga 4 sektorer med xxxxx. Följande är min allvarliga oro xxxxx flygande teknik anslutning till standardrutiner och avsaknad av CRM.

1. studsade Landing: I absolut lugna vindar på Muscat, ILS 26 R flygplanet studsade efter landning och landade mycket bestämt andra gången, i min mening var det på grund av felaktig flare teknik.

2. Han har konstant vana att göra och sedan utföra FMS flygning och inflygning förändringar utan att informera andra besättningsmedlemmar, som omfattar radering av planerad rutt punkter och skapa och genomföra nya etappmål för inflygning. Detta är en allvarlig flygsäkerhets frågan och han måste ha informerats om företagets standardrutiner i ämnet.

3. Han har en farlig tendens att gå huvuden och göra och utför FMS förändringar som PF, och att alltför väl under 7500 fot i Dubai terminalområdet med extrem flygtrafik runt. Allt detta gör han även när PM inte gör någon annan uppgift. När berättade att avstå från detta, gör han gester irritation och sedan sluta tillkännage FMA förändringar som en reaktion, och svarar inte på FMS förändringar aviserats PM för hans räkning.

4. Nästan på varje före och efter start checklista och landning checklista han tillkännager den genom minnet och inte ens bry sig om att ta ut eller använda en på styrspak, vilket är uppenbart eftersom han inte slå på ljuset och hans anteckning bok täcker checklista på styrspak. Ibland tar han ut checklistan men gör inga försök att läsa den, han bara håller det och meddela kontroller verbalt.

5. Han gör gester och höjer rösten när tillsagd att göra något han inte vill veta något och visar ingen respekt och artighet till andra besättningsmedlemmar.

474 DXB-KHI Dubai till Karachi, Pakistan

trötthet rapport

En övergång till morgonflygning efter 3 dagar nattflygningar sedan tillbaka igen för att flyga sen natt flygning inte tillåta mig att få åtminstone några timmars sömn innan flygningen. Dessutom har jag kommer från en lång kamp som behövde en ordentlig vila.

478 BTS-DXB
Bratislava, Slovakien, till Dubai

Överskrider maximal timmar tull

Jag var schema att flyga till TIF [Taif, Saudiarabien] rapporteringen 0540Z. Jag ska inleda denna rapport med anmärkning att detta var en exceptionell dag, och vi var alla i en viss grad av chock från tragedin vi hade alla bara hört talas om. Jag rapporterade i tid och vi fortsatte till flygplanet. Samtidigt förbereda flygplanet för passagerare, som kallas besättning kontroll mig och berättade att de behövde ändra mig till ett annat flyg, BTS (785/6). Jag sa att jag skulle föredra att inte använda en så lång dag om möjligt, men eftersom det var en sådan ovanlig dag, om de verkligen behövde mig då jag naturligtvis skulle hjälpa. Crew kontroll sa att jag var deras enda alternativ och 100% de behövde mig, så jag gick. Det handlade om 0640Z när jag kunde nå andra flygplan, 2 andra besättningsmedlemmar kom liksom efter mig och vi avgick på 0757Z. Resten av dagen gått enligt plan med cirka 30 minuter för att hålla på ankomsten tillbaka till Dubai. Jag var ledig på 2131Z. Den planerade längd plikt dag, från "off block" till "ledig" (eftersom jag redan hade kontrollerats) för den flygningen är 13:00. Den faktiska tiden vi gjorde det var 13:34.

Jag visste att jag måste vara högt på timmar som jag redan hade en flygning bort efter en standby ropa för att behålla min legalitets den veckan, men jag antar att jag inte skulle bli ombedd att göra något som skulle ta mig över någon limits.Looking på ecrew, står det att min totala tjänstgöringstiden för en 7-dagars period, från 13 till 19 mars var 62 timmar. OM-A 7.18.1 säger att max bör vara 55, eller ökas upp till 60 i händelse av oförutsedda förseningar. Jag förstår att dessa var exceptionella omständigheter, men även med tanke på att det ser ut som jag blev ombedd att utföra plikt att veta att det skulle ta mig över den maximala tullgränsen. Vi lämnade så snabbt som vi kunde, och flög planet som förväntat. Jag upp detta, främst för säkerheten för våra besättningar. I tider som dessa, där vi upplever extrem störning, är det lätt att glömma gränser, men de är där av en anledning. Vi är ofta schema nära gränsen ändå, och bemanning avdelningen behöver vara försiktiga med vad de ber folk att göra. Om mina beräkningar inte är korrekta, då är jag villig att rättas till, men jag bara rapportera vad de systemets berättar.

484 DXB-KWI Dubai till Kuwait

Olämpliga för FLYG

Efter 3 konsekutiva nattjänstgöring slutar i morse vid 02:19 LT jag kunde inte vila ordentligt för min nästa resa FZ63 med inställelsetid vid 16:20 LT. Jag rådde Crew Kontroll och erbjöd sig att byta min efter dag för varje flygning så att jag kunde få en längre viloperiod, men det fanns inget alternativ tillgängligt.

491 AAA-AAA

Mycket svårt vecka efter olyckan, mycket uppståndelse, ops störningar, många flygningar i följd, går från Kuwait till DWC [Kuwait till Dubai World Central] mycket dålig WX från 6000ft tills landning på DWC, följdes under en G / A. Brist på sömn i natt, bara tre timmars oavbruten sömn. Jag känner mig trött.

495 OMDB-URKK Dubai till Krasnodar

Flyg till Krasnodar planeras i diskretion när man tar hänsyn till garaunteed avisning på destination och vädret i Dubai vid ankomsten som oundvikligen skulle skapa förseningar, för att inte tala planerar att komma fram till morgonen upptagen tid i Dubai. Faktisk FDP ursprungligen 10:30, max FDP 11:15, justerad FDP med besättning planering 10:40. Detta 10:40 justeras FDP endast uppnås genom att minska på marken i KRR från en timme till 45 minuter, helt orealistiska för flygplatsen. Under en dag flygning kan detta vara en stram men acceptabelt sätt att planera.

Under en natt flygning denna metod för att trycka till gränsen är oacceptabelt och osäkra. Både kaptenen och FO kallades från vänteläge. Den ursprungliga FO kallade sjuka vid 1500LT, jag kallades på 1800LT (1:55 före rapporten). Om besättningen kontroll hade ringt mig vid 1500 för att informera mig om natten flygning jag skulle tilldelas, skulle jag har förberett väl genom att ta en tre timmars tupplur. Hur det gick nu är att jag hadnt sov före flygningen och därmed var extremt trött efter en 11:31 FDP natt. Crew kontroll måste anpassa sin förståelse av den mänskliga faktorn.

497 NS-NS

Jag är inte passar att använda flyg morgon. Jag gjorde mitt bästa för att göra mitt arbete de senaste 2 dagarna efter några sömnstörningar på grund av olyckan. under mina 2 sista nattflygningar jag lyckats få 2/3 timmars sömn per dag. Jag kom hem idag efter en lång Kuwait försenad på grund av vädret i Dubai. Jag Sov 0130 och vaknade upp på grund av situationen tillbaka till min hemstad relaterad till attackerna i Bryssel. Jag sedan kunde få någon sömn fram till nu (0135 am)

Under de senaste 8 dagar, har jag gjort eftermiddagen flyg (dubbel sektorn), följt av natten, sedan morgonen, sedan 1 lediga dagar följt av natten, sedan natt följt igen av en tidig morgon som jag bara inte kan göra.

498 MCT-DXB Muscat till Dubai

Ursprungligen planerat att göra flyg DXB / MHD / DXB rapport med tid på 11: 55Z, och planerade att avsluta tull på 19: 05Z. Flygningen avbröts för meteorologiska skäl. Besättningen kontroll ringde mig innan jag lämnade hemmet informera om den inställda och ge mig hem STBY start på vid den aktuella tidpunkten för mitt betänkande Team ursprungliga flygningen (11:55 Z). Omkring 15:40 (L), som kallas kontroll besättningen mig information om att det fanns en flygning jag skulle behöva flyga. DXB / BND / DXB / HOF / DXB / HOF rapport med tid på 13:00 (UTC), dubbel sektor med beräknad ankomsttid till 22:20 (UTC), dvs för 02:20 (lokal), så 04:15 minuter längre än planerat på min lista. Eftersom flygningen var en dubbel sektor, skulle den maximala tjänstgöringstiden vara 10:45, vilket kan flyga upp till 23: 45Z. Vid ankomsten på kontoret, gick jag att prata med NCC besättningen kontroll och sa att jag inte var redo att flyga förrän för sent eftersom min ursprungliga flygningen skulle avslutas vid 1905Z. Jag veta att den här gången skulle jag inte ha förutsättningar för att hjälpa dem att utvidga min plikt. I BND ringde jag besättningen kontroll eftersom flygningen vid den tiden var redan sent 01:30, så flygningen jag gjorde, skulle jag förlänga min plikt. De var inte berörda. Efter landning på DXB, kallas en gång för besättningen kontroll anger att som jag sa innan jag kunde inte förlänga min plikt, och att som flygningen försenades 01:40 och fortfarande skulle behöva byta plan, skulle jag inte göra det flyg till HOF. Besättningen kontroll beslöt då att sätta mig på flyget till MCT, som försenade mer 01:30.

Jag ringde besättningen kontroll, och än en gång ignorerades, att säga att jag inte kunde ta MCT flygning som jag informerades tidigare genom telefon ringer två gånger. Styr besättningen berättade för mig att gå till MCT, vilket skulle innebära en extra besättningsmedlem MCT första morgonflyget att få planet, och ville att jag skulle stanna fyra timmar i planet att återvända som deadheading.

Jag tyckte att det här en fullständig absurd och bristande respekt. Jag insåg att besättningen kontrollen är inte oroad över den fysiska eller psykiska tillstånd av besättningen, eftersom en sådan situation hamnar orsakar en hel del stress. Enligt min mening tvingade de situationen, och jag bara åter MCT flygande från i fråga om de besättningar som var med mig. I DXB landade vi i och förlängning av tullen 37 minuter. Långt inte haft tillgång till NCC eller ring styr besättningen att underteckna diskretion.

besättningen kontroll måste lära och att veta att utvidgningen av tullen skall ske sporadiskt, och som inte kan vara lika vanligt som praxis som har hänt.

499 RUH-DXB Riyadh, Saudiarabien, Dubai

Jag skulle vilja föreslå en förändring i deltagarlistan när dubbel flyg sektorn. En gång till, går, jag var tvungen att förlänga min plikt i en dubbel sektor flygning. Vad har blivit en vanlig metod i Flydubai, bör ske endast ett par gånger ... Detta är fakta. En flygning med bara 35 minuter för att förlänga tullen med byte av flygplan på marken, och två ankomster på upptagen tid, styr besättningen verkligen tror att detta flyg skulle anlända på schemat? Jag vill inte tro att styr besättningen tror att detta skulle hända. Ledsen att säga det, men någon vet att dessa skulle behöva förlänga tullen. Med denna gång som flyg befälhavare hade jag att gå igenom stressen att utvidga tullen, som har blivit konstant praxis på Flydubai, når alltid trött. Inte att säga att jag inte har provat någon åtgärd, ringde jag även kontrollpersonal ... och svaret är alltid detsamma, "kaptenen jag har piloterna att göra detta flyg inte", eller inte berörs. Nu är att reflektera över vad som hände och hur piloter har flugit och fördelningen av flyg intervall, som ofta sätter Grattis till besättningen, och samtidigt ger honom en flygning tidigt på morgonen eller dubbel sektorn. Det skulle inte vara för mycket begärt lite om dem som gör ingenting för besättningen. De som vid tidpunkten för åtstramning ringa oss göra en tjänst. Företaget håller på att förlora förtroende av piloter, och jag kan känna och se den när jag flyger med kollegor eller ens ha ett bra samtal ... det har alltid kontrollpersonal som slutpunkt.

516 NS-NS

Efter att ha gjort FZ xxxon den 25 mars, som handlar om ett bombhot. Jag gick in i bedömning av en timme och 20 minuter att min totala tjänstgöringstiden upp till 15 timmar och 50 minuter. Jag kom tillbaka till min lägenhet runt 01.15 och sov fram till 05,58.

Jag har inte kunnat sova sedan dess ..

Jag ringde trött att Crewcontrol på 1:30 lokal Dubai tid. Baserat på mig att inte kunna sova, och de senaste veckorna extrema tryck efter kraschen. Jag tycker inte att jag kommer att kunna arbeta säkert ett flygplan tills jag har haft en chans att återhämta sig. Min nästa plikt är inställd på att börja på wed den 30. Som jag hoppas jag kommer att vara redo för ..

520 DXB-TIF Dubai till Taif, Saudiarabien

Kallas trött för min natt TIF på grund av otillräcklig vila före tull, tullen tänkt att börja på 1950. Jag avslutade min tidigare tjänst vid 2230 på 25: e och var i sängen för midnatt, jag sov i ca 7 timmar, men detta avbröts jag kunde inte få någon mer vila före 1630. jag sätta detta ned till förändringen i sömnmönster.

528 DXB-HBE Dubai till Borg El Arab, Egypten

Jag kan inte använda FZxxx på kvällen den yyth på grund av säkerhetsskäl av trötthet. Jag heter i trötthet på yy eftersom jag kunde inte sova efter återkomsten till DXB på 0200z.

536 BTS-DXB
Bratislava Dubai

Den 785/786 flyg till och från BTS besättning med två uppsättningar av piloter, men kabinen hade bara en uppsättning av besättningen att driva en flygning med en begränsning av 14:15 och en planerad tull på 14:00. Flygningen avgick 45 minuter sent. Jag förstår att det skäl som angavs var att det inte finns tillräckliga grindar tillgängliga vid den tiden på morgonen, för att underlätta en i tid avgång. De första passagerarna anlände 5 minuter innan energiskattedirektivet. Jag förstår att flygningen var lagligt planerat, men det fanns ingen ansträngning, tanke eller logistik tillgängliga för att uppnå planen. Kabinpersonalen tullar för en sådan flygning är ansträngande; Säljer mat och tullfritt, ger ut matlådor och sedan städa upp, alla uppnås samtidigt passerar jetströmmar med tillhörande turbulens. Jag tror att bältes tecken lades på av cockpit arbetar 785 åtminstone fem gånger. Turbulensen nådde måttlig vid ett par tillfällen. (Samma inträffade på väg tillbaka till Dubai och hastigheten sänktes till M.076 vid flera tillfällen.)

På anländer till BTS, tog jag över driften kontroll för den andra sektorn och diskretion var diskutera med hela besättningen.

Det fanns oro bland besättningen att deras energinivåer inte skulle vara säker, om de ingått diskretion. Den totala tull i början av sektorn 2 uppskattades till 15 timmar.

Jag vidarebefordrade denna oro till NCC. NCC föreslog var turn-around bör förkortas. En avgångstid i 10 minuter och en ökning med CI till 150 skulle undvika att gå in i diskretion. Jag sa till dem det var oacceptabelt. Vid den tiden hade inte en passagerare har bordade för FZ786.

planerar också flyget till en CI 150 var helt oärligt väger kända prognosen för turbulens.

NCC bortse frågan säkerhet presenteras för dem och bestämde att det var rent matematisk summa som måste övervinnas. När jag läser del A, bör de publicerade blocktiden användas för planering, så tyder på en förändring i Cl att lösa problemet var inte lagligt. Dessutom slutar planering på besättningen rapport och eventuella förändringar som kan spara tid och förhindra rätt att föras in, är för cockpit för att bedöma dvs tidig avresa, genvägar eller flyga snabbare, inte NCC och på den tiden, min bedömning var att diskretion var oundviklig.

Jag har också problem med att NCC inledningsvis endast hade en oro och det var att få namnen på dem besättningsmedlem (s) som inte anses utöva sin rätt att använda diskretion. Detta är irrelevant. Jag kan bara anta det var motbjudande skäl och är dålig praxis som bör upphävas av ledningen.

542 DXB-TSE
Dubai till Astana, Kazakstan

Möjlig Trötthet induceras på grund av dålig / olaglig planering Operativ.

Igår var jag och alla mina besättning vi där planerat att driva en natt Astana under natten, rapportering på 1555z.

Maximalt tillåten för cockpit besättning var 1115 som föra vår högsta tjänstgöringsperiod för att sluta vid 0310z. FLYG var planerad att landa på 0310 EXAKT lämnar inga FRITID för eventuella förseningar eller oplanerade STENSKVÄTTA, HOLDIG, BOARDING DELAY eller något annat. BASICCALY ÄVEN VID PAPPERS flygningen var LEGAL aldrig kommer att ske utan EN UTVIDGNING AV TULLEN perioden sedan början.

MEN, kan börja från början.

-Första Faktum. På eftermiddagen jag och Fo både vi kallar besättningen manöverorgan som ger en heads up om flygningen och det problem som vi skulle ha gått att gå in om vi där drift en flygning med en sådan planering av arbetsuppgiften. Svar från Ncc var att de skulle ha ökade kostnader index och minska på marken.

-Andra Faktum. Väder på resmålet bedömdes vara marginell med dimma och mycket dålig sikt leder i en eventuell avledning och en ens värsta scenario som den redan planerade en! Med tanke på temperaturen på 4 ^ Celsius och att tanka bränsle på grund av en möjlig avledning ett avisnings borde ha varit beakta och så det faktum att en reducerad tid på marken var omöjligt.

-Tredje Faktum.

När vi rapporterar till vår plikt, samlas färdplanen, märker vi att den andra flygningen, uppskattades att komma i Dubai 0326. väl bakom högsta tull på 0310z. OLAGLIG. Jag säger det igen. OLAGLIG!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Första sektorn, likaså andra, var planerat att flygas på Fl280 / 290 och index på 150 föra flygningen landa ja 10 minuter tidigt men utan någon marginal på hastighets fönster och ingen möjlighet att undvika väder som i går kväll var prognosen längs hela rutten. -Forth Faktum. Kabinpersonal saknas på rapportering, bara tre kabinpersonalen de planerade att använda denna plikt och även detta sätta i uppmärksamhet bemanning på eftermiddagen. Ytterligare kabinpersonalen de rapporterade på flygplanet när ombordstigning var redan på plats.

Nu är historien om hur en väl etablera flygbolag som FZ planerar en flygning idag men är inte poängen. Jag förstår svårigheterna genomgår under denna period, men är inte poängen. Jag vet Im ingen att säga vad som borde ha gjorts och vad människor mer expert än mig de ska göra, men min poäng är att: vad som är lagligt är inte säker. Inte är säkert att hyvlat en besättning ATT ARBETA 11:15 minuter i den djupa NATT, förväntar sig att SHOT En CAT3 STRATEGI, FORTSÄTT tillbaka till Dubai, kanske HOLD OCH LAND förlänga TULL OCH DÅ KANSKE rapport för en nästa resa RAPPORTERING NÄSTA Morgon i tidigt på morgonen. ÄR INTE lagligt att planera en FLYG REDAN veta att tull skulle vara EXTEND täcker deras BOTTEN på de papper arbete och säger, är lagligt. Inte är säkert att SÄGA KAPTEN ditt beslut men försök att hjälpa oss, OM U göra detta om U GÖR ATT DU kan göra det. Alla den här typen av operationer som leder in trötthet och DET shuold förekomma någon ACN att stoppa människor ATT RINGA TRÖTTHET med rädslan ATT Loos DE MEDICAL LICENS eftersom detta ledande inom ett ännu farligare situation.

553 DXB-KBL
Dubai till Kabul

Efter två earlies och en natt flygning landar vid middagstid i dag, jag behövde verkligen sova vid ankomsten hem, på grund av dåliga sovande cykler på de sista 3 nätter. 6 timmar senare gick jag till sängs försöker sova för min 03:00 rapport, men jag var bara kunna sova en timme, alltså inte tillräckligt med vila för att slutföra min 9h plikt. Viloperioder var nog när det gäller timmar, men tiderna var knappast hanterbart att få mer än 5-6 timmars sömn för två av de tre senaste nätterna, som fick mig att gå till sängs efter landning i dag.

XXXXX
Beirut, Libanon, till Dubai

säkerhetsproblem

Det finns en verklig säkerhet oro xxxxx. Under en period på cirka fyra år har det varit fyra eller fem schema arbetsuppgifter med berörda besättningsmedlemmen. Sammanfattningsvis har det sett att besättningsmedlemmen visar liten eller ingen situationsmedvetenhet, begränsad operationell förståelse, har en tendens att bli upprörd eller inflammerad när du ombeds eller uppmanas att agera på en parameter och gör ursäkter och platser skylla på andra när misstag är gjord. Besättningsmedlemmarna "prestanda under de senaste rostered arbetsuppgifter har fläckas med många drifts- och hanterings misstag som krävde omedelbart ingripande för att förhindra en situation blir värre.

Det är inte möjligt att dokumentera varje möjlig händelse som ingen post hölls. Men med varje tull med nämnda xxxxx, är konstant övervakning som krävs för att garantera flygsäkerheten.

På en plikt att återvända från Moskva medan närmar ställning SAV ledande kallades till cockpit för att möjliggöra en kort toalett paus och göra en färskt kaffe. Vid återkomsten till cockpit jag bevittnade xxxxx inte har sin headsetet, inte heller var talarna påslagen. Kontakt togs omedelbart med Teheran ATC. Under tiden xxxxx inte har headsetet placeras på, Tehran ATC hade försökt flera gånger att kontakta flygplanet. Xxxxx ursäkt och sade att Teheran ATC inte var sanningsenlig att många försök har gjorts att kontakta flygplanet. Den senaste tidens händelser belyst några oroande beteende. Vid anständigt i Dubai (OMDW), var clearance ges att sjunka till 9000 fot. Vid plana ut, farten var 260 knop. Xxxxx blev ombedd att bromsa hastigheten ner till 250 knop. Svaret var i linje med "250 knop är endast en rekommendation, begränsningen är bara 5000 ft".

After an ill-timed and uncomfortable exchange, the xxxxx begrudgingly reduced the speed to 250 knots. On final approach into Dubai, tower instructed that after landing vacate at V6. Auto brakes 3 was then selected to allow for the best chance to make the rapid exit.

Upon landing the xxxxx applied excessive braking, to the extent which would cause passenger anxiety. “I have control” was commanded twice before a more aggressive tone had to be used for the xxxxx to completely relinquish control. The braking by the xxxxx was excessive and unnecessary. Deadheading crew remarked after landing that the deceleration was quite uncomfortable.

562

On several occasions NCC disturbed me on my days OFF without having volunteer to fly on the day. There where occasions when they called me at 0200 in the morning. This has to stop ASAP. We are working on just the minimum days off in a calendar month and instead of the company tackling the actual problem of hiring more pilots they are trying to over work us and get the job done on minimum crew. Days OFF for us are precious and we need time to relax and spent time with our families.

563 DXB-MED Dubai to Madinah, Saudi Arabia

Unable to sleep and have been awake for most of the night. Possible causes are roster, kids and recent events.

565

Fatigued due to impossible change in my body clock. I came home after flight around 00:30LT (01/april). Went to bed at 01:00LT, slept 8h, woke up at 09:00LT. Normal person can sleep naturally after being awake 14h-16h. I had a standby starting at 22:00 which is the time the body need to go sleep. My duty could be extended until 14:15LT which would mean being awake for 29h. Also, after this duty which finishes at 04:01LT the next duty starts at 05:30LT next day which means another 24h body clock change.

This means 2 body clock changes in just 2 days. This is poor rostering, specially if it is occurring while having 1 day OFF in 11 days period.

570 MUX-DXB
Multan, Pakistan, to Dubai

Having operated 2 disrupted duties in as many shifts, one being an 18.5 hour duty, which did have the follow duty removed, and then subsequently operating the next assigned duty, i found myself to be extremely tired.

The second duty entailed being 1:37hr in discretion, as the result of a turn back to dubai and then doing our utmost to assist in trying to get the flights done. Sign off in Dubai was 11:17 local. My original roster had me with stby starting at 2000 local. as a result of our delayed return to DXB this was changed to a 0100-0600 stay. When I went to sign the discretion report I informed crewing that I would probably be calling fatigued later in the day if this was to be held.

I did not want to cause any more problems than needed, just wanted to highlight that I was exhausted and if I was unable to get sufficient rest this would be the case.

We came to a solution where i helped by picking up a KHI duty with report of 0650 local on 01/04, thus given me every chance to get some decent rest and be fit to fly, which I was.

Prior to operating the rescheduled/delayed 339/340 the discretion and fatigue issues were discussed by both myself and fellow flight crew and also with the cabin. At no point did I force anyone to do something they did not want to do. The FO elected to continue, as he could see that by doing so we were doing our bit to try and help out. the cabin crew were not too enthused by running this late, and when given the option to change to a shorter duty with an earlier finish this was taken up. It should be noted that NCC did explore many options to try to mitigate our going into discretion, but were being met with resistance at every turn.

574 DXB-BGW
Dubai to Baghdad, Iraq

Flydubai flyg poster - de läckta dokumenten

Baghdad international airport. Photograph: Mohammed Ameen/Reuters

When we arrived at the a/c, the engineer was in the flight deck, and he said that he needed a few minutes to complete his checks. I asked him if the a/c needed a daily check, and he told me that he was doing it at that time. I asked him if he was alone and how much time he needed cause the flight was already delayed. He said that he was alone and needed about 25 minutes!!! When i spoke to Maintrol office, i asked the shift supervisor of how much time is needed for a daily check to be completed, and he told me about 1:30 hours for 1 man.

If the engineers are 2 or 3, half of that time or even less. So i questioned him how 1 engineer will perform a daily check and a turn around alone, in 25 minutes on our a/c. He said he will call us back.

Then the engineer came back to the flight deck and told us that he will not perform the daily check after all and they will push it for later on that day.

So, if i wasn't questioning the maintrol, the engineer would have signed an incomplete daily check for our aircraft???

579 DXB-TRV
Dubai to Thiruvananthapuram, India

Scheduled Duty -

I would like to highlight the issues of potential fatigue concerning this particular duty and the circumstances which will impact crew.

The duty 439/440 DXB – TRV – DXB starts at a report time of 1920, for me this followed a day off which is fine, however I normally wake at around 9am and it is difficult to get back to sleep before this duty reports although I tried at 3pm to sleep but circadian rhythms/sleep pattern prevented me from getting any additional sleep. Therefore by the time I reported I had been awake for 10 hours 20 mins. The duty to TRV is planned to arrive back at DXB at 0615 which realistically for me means 21 hours 15 minutes awake. In reality before we started this particular duty we were delayed 1 hour and then had a further tech delay of 4 hours plus which resulted in the crew operating outbound and positioning on the return which was a total duty of 1537. If the tech issue had of been resolved before the necessity to employ a further crew we could have left going into discretion which would have resulted in an extremely long day for all concerned.

I appreciate that it is difficult to resolve the scheduling of this duty, however if it is scheduled on the second duty of a series of over night duties it might help in getting sufficient sleep to enable this duty to be completed with a greater degree of alertness/safety?

599 DXB-GYD
Dubai to Baku, Azerbaijan

Our operation to Baku currently has us on the ground for a scheduled time of 2 1/2 hours. We arrive at 0430 local dubai time and leave at 0700 local dubai time. This is the time when our body is at a circadian low, exactly the time when we should be sleeping. Unfortunately we cannot take proper rest in the aircraft and we are then faced with a 2.5 hour flight back to Dubai.

Having operated this flight last night I can testify to the fact that this mode of operation is extremely fatiguing for the entire crew.

When we arrived to the approach in Dubai the captain and I were both extremely tired as I'm sure most of the crew usually is when operating this flight. When I asked Ops Control the reason for the extended ground time they said it was 'a commercial decision based on available slot times in Dubai and Baku'. In light of the current issues we face in this company regarding fatigue and according the SMS chapter 2.5 I think it is pertinent that a re assessment is made of the impact on safety of this type of unnecessarily long ground times for this and other flights.

Besides the impact on safety, the extended ground time now also poses a security risk with our ACN security 2016-015 describing escalating tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Having an aircraft on ground any longer than necessary when our security department is issuing an ACN about the same region is, in my humble opinion, a risk.

602 DXB-SJJ
Dubai to Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

I was about to report for FZ761B (a requested flight), at 08:15 local, but due my last duty, finished at approx 06:55 local I was not able to get any sleep.

These nigh to day or day to night shifts, really meet up with my body clock in a way I can not get any rest.Its been quite difficult to me to get some rest, my body is taking longer to recover from night duties despite all my efforts (healthy diet, exercise, etc). A night shift disrupt my sleeping pattern in a way that affects my future duties even my days off. I've been sick lately due an decrease of my body defenses mainly caused by not resting properly.

XXXXX

It has come to my attention (by other colleagues) that capt xxxxx has a tendency to “touch” the engine start levers in-flight at regular intervals.

I have never met the Captain and never flown with him, therefore I can not confirm the aforementioned accusation. If this is not the case I apologize for reporting a colleague, but as this is a “habit” that relates to flight safety I'd rather report it while there still time for corrective actions.

XXXXX (Safety)
Dubai

I would like to report something that came to my attention for investigation and confirmation. A number of F/O have come across to inform me that a captain named xxxxx in short intervals taps the start levers in flight with different excuses every time and makes F/Os nervous. I have not seen this, but the fact that more than five F/Os confirmed it is very serious to make an investigation on the issue.

633

Due to having, in the last two days, day flights and landing yesterday at 22:30 Local time and finishing my duty at 23:00, I am unable to change my sleeping and rest patterns in order to report at 00:40 Local time.

I feel unrested and unfit to fly due to the pattern change, and I feel that it would be unsafe to work in this condition

661

I called fatigued for my night BAH (29) reporting at 23:55 as I hadn't had sufficient to rest prior to the 1630 cutoff. I finished my delayed MCT/KWI duty at 00.51 on the xxth and then was given 25 hours rest prior to my scheduled MCT(41) on 16th reporting at 0225. At 00.36 on 16th crew control called and told me I was now on a KWI reporting at 0125 giving me 49 minutes until my duty commenced! I felt tired but able to do the newly assigned KWI duty. I finished this duty at 0725 on 16th and only managed to sleep for 3 hours as my body clock was still based upon sleeping during the night … In light of this I called unfit due fatigue at 1615 as I felt I would not get sufficient rest prior to my duty commencing at 23.55.

I feel the main reason for my lack of rest and extreme tiredness is due to the 25 rest period switching me from a day pattern to a nights. 1 night I am going to bed at 2am 24 hours later I am reporting at 2am. It's a completely unworkable pattern and is extremely fatiguing, combined with an already high workload, 800+ hours a year with double that in duty, these are tiring in themselves and adding poor rostering with 18-30 rest periods is too much to ask.

670 DXB-KHI
Dubai to Karachi

Being standby for 11hrs 30min on the 14th and called out for a flight to SAW coming back after more than 1hr delay at 04:30 then having a KTM simulator the day after from 01:15 till 07:00, caused me to be exhausted, fatigued, need some night sleep and unable to fly another night flight which is KHI reporting at 23:30.

683 DXB-AHB
Dubai to Abha, Saudi Arabia

A Company Notam for the destination AHB was incorrect because referencing a FIR Notam that did not existed in the FIR notam section the topic was routing and procedure in the SCATANA Area. Upon request of clarification the dispatcher informed us that the referenced notam (A691/15) doesn't exist anymore and there is a new FIR notam with a different name, and after this verbal explanation we have been requested for the First time to proceed to the aircraft. I made clear that wasn't a good practice to leave with incorrect paperwork. The dispatcher then decided to hung up and come to talk to us in person explaining that probably from Nav services no one verified the notams and that Co Notam was expired long tome ago and the new FIR Notam regarding the SCATANA has been changed and no one adjusted the company notam.

Once again, for the SECOND time, he requested us to proceed to the aircraft with the incorrect papers. I refused to do it without and adjustment to the briefing pack. shortly after i received a call from this number … trying to explain me what we already new, and for the THIRD time, if we could please proceed to the aircraft. It's then that i felt the need to explain that incorrect/illegal paperwork could be a serious finding in case of a Ramp inspection in any place and that myself as a PIC could be liable for accepting it so I said that i wanted an adjusted briefing pack. Only then they offered to send a written amendment via ACARS prior departure. One consideration to be added is that I was called from STBY at 4am (after 20 hours rest from my previous duty and after switching sleeping cycle 4 times in the preceding 7 days) and so was the FO after a busy week himself. weather was marginal around the area, and as a fact descending to FL240 we were in ICING condition and Stormy CLOUDS that were not mentioned on the Weather chart nor Engine Anti ICE was considered in the planned fuel consumption.

All this said I thought was UNSAFE and Wrong to be put under all that pressure to leave on time without the serenity we should be entitled prior take people in the air.

686 DXB-DAC
Dubai to Dhaka, Bangladesh

Due to rostering and sleep disturbances i was unable to report for duty.

706

Called fatigue as I was unable to rest adequately in between alternating night/early morning duties . My last duty was a night HYD with reporting time of 1950 local on 21 Apr 2016. After reaching home from this duty I fell asleep around 0800 and woke up 1600.

I went to bed again at 1900 however I was unable to fall asleep and at 0100 I realised that I will be fatigued for my duty to KBL with a reporting time of 0310 on xx Apr 2016. I would've been awake for almost 20 hours by the time I would be landing back in Dubai, I did not feel this would be safe.

707 KRT-DXB
Khartoum, Sudan, to Dubai

It has been repetitive during this month of April having more than ninety block time the last 28 days (not taking into account five additional simulator hours that happened on the 14th night that are not considered in the total block time computation).

With peaks of 96:08 on the 11th and 98:46 on The 19th. There were also changes in the scheduled flights/sims/duties that ended up in two additional STBY days that both were assigned for two different flights, EBL on the 15th and ASB on the 19th. When NCC called on last stand by to report to the ASB flight the Crew-Control Officer was noticed about me having already 93.5 hours before duty started on the last 28 days (with no mention about the additional 5 hours of the SIM), and it would turn into a 98.5 period, but no changes since I believe it was within legality.

Today I started another 5 days duty period of day to night swap then minimum rest, and two evenings. After, a single day off to continue with another four days (finally one single day off in ten days duty). I am feeling fit to fly at the beginning of every duty, but in last months in some cases my performance drops dramatically even after asking for controlled rest periods (sometimes more than one in the same flight). I also try my best to manage my rest since at home the feeling of tiredness is continuous, but specially on swapping day/night/ … duties, trying to deal with a family life and having most of the times single days off, it is very difficult to find the way to sleep and rest appropriate time.

730 KWI-DWC
Kuwait to Dubai

Multiple mistakes due to fatigue conditions.

On assigned service during all flight there was a number of situations like missing items on procedures, erratic actions, missing radio calls and feeling of tiredness and sleepy, although at the beginning of it I was feeling ok. All could be treated as low intensity, but finally so many mistakes can lead to an incident or even an accident. Things to take into account could be the roster: in the last 16 days an average of 93+ hours -considering the last 28 days- with peaks of more than 95hrs on six of those days.

Another one is that I was assigned for a long day 3-sector one, swapping next day into night and after, minimum rest for this evening duty.

This situation is getting worse with the time that is why I filled an ASR some days ago, and finally today in addition of this fatigue report, I called sick for my next duty.

735 DXB-COK
Dubai to Cochin, India

Busy week with 5 long days in a row to include 3 multiple sector days. The last day was another 12 hour day door to door and reaching home just before midnight. Only 2 days off to be followed by a long 14hr day door to door. I woke up early morning around 7am as this is the rythem that the roster leading up to the fatigue call dictated.

I tried to rest further in the day but was unable. Leaving me with insufficient sleep for the night flight planned. Long days followed by insufficient rest and a flip to a night flight is the cause for the fatigue. I felt very unrested after the 2 days off as the days leading up were so long. Then to do another 14 hour day and be rested enough for a night flip was always going to be tough.

763 DXB-TSE
Dubai to Astana

Duty Changes with short notice and rest planning

I was originally scheduled to fly as A crew to TSE report time of 2010 local. At 1946 crew control called me an advised that I would have to operate both sectors. I pointed out to them that I was not sufficiently rested to do both legs as they were effectively doubling my duty. I was then told that I should always be rested to do both sectors and that crewing did not have enough crew to cover these flights. I then reiterated the point that I was not fit for such a large change in FDP and that I was only fit to fly a flight of similar FDP as the original A crew on the TSE. I was subsequently put on an MUX.

Despite the tone and manner I was spoken to on the phone, I think the key focus of this ASR is the safety issue that needs to be highlighted here. Crew cannot be expected to plan rest on what might happen.

I was simply not fit to fly for that amount of FDP.

If the change had been given with sufficient amount of time to take additional rest then I would have been able to safely accept the change.

By crewing's logic all crews should be rested for any flight, to any destination, with any FDP and be able to accept the change at any time. This is simply not feasible, safe or wise. Furthermore, I would like clarification as to where in our manuals crewing are able to make these large changes to FDP at such short notice and more guidance on flying as A crew, B crew. Whilst small changes in report time or changes onto similar FDP flights are acceptable, no crew can be expected to safely accept changes of such large proportions.

765 CMB-DXB
Colombo, Sri Lanka, to Dubai

ASR was filed for exceeding 250kts below 5000ft. Safety Dept questioned if this could have been due to tiredness and/or fatigue. I consulted an AME Psychiatrist at the earliest possible time and he concluded that I am suffering from mental/physical fatigue. Probably caused from a Fatigue event in October 2015 and repeated sickness and tiredness since that time. Symptoms increasing until being hospitalised in February 2016 with Exhaustion. Annual Leave and Sickness Leave subsequent to the events failed to solve the fatigue. He recommended to take time off, to be advised by him directly to the Company. I am to attend again at the end of the period to see if further help is needed.

Hälsa

388 DXB-TBS

Dubai to Tbilisi, Georgia

AFTER 30 MIN OF FLIGHT THE SENIOR FLIGHT ATTENDANT INFORMED TO US WE HAD A MEDICAL ISSUE ON BOARD WITHIN A FEMALE PAX THAT WAS UNABLE TO BREATHE NORMALLY. – BLOOD PRESSURE REPORTED 70/40 AND THE PAX APPARENTLY HAVE EXPERIENCED DEPRESSED LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS. WE CALLED THE MEDLINK AND ALSO ASKED FOR A DOCTOR ON BOARD FOR IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE OF THE PAX. THE MEDLINK SAID TO PROVIDE ASPHIRIN, OXYGEN AND TO FLAT HER AND WAIT 10 TO 15 MIN TO CHECK HER BLOOD PRESSURE AGAIN. THE DOCTOR ON BOARD SUGGESTED TO DIVERSION, HOWEVER MEDLINK SUGGESTED TO WAIT. AFTER 15 MIN WE CALLED THEM BACK – THE PAX SITUATION WAS THE SAME AT THAT TIME – THE DOCTOR ON BOARD AND MEDLINK RECOMMENDED TO DIVERT. WE MADE A CONTACT WITH NCC – THEY ASKED TO INFORM OUR POSITION AND THE NCC INITIALLY SUGGESTED TO DIVERT TO OIFM OR OISS HOWEVER, WAIT FOR FINAL DECISION. SO, WE DECIDED TO HOLD OVER YZD (ONE HOUR WAY FROM DXB AND TWO HOURS WAY FROM TBS) AND IT TOOK APPROXIMATELY 40 MIN TO THE NCC AND MEDLINK TO INFORM US WHERE TO GO. AFTER OPT CHECK AND WEATHER CHECK WE REALIZED THAT THE OIFM WAS NOT AN OPTION AND OISS WAS PERFORMANCE RESTRICTED – WE WERE ALMOST 3 TONS ABOVE MLW AT THAT TIME. MEDLINK CALLED US BACK AND SAID THAT GOING BACK TO OMDB OR OKBK WOULD BE THE BEST OPTION. THUS, WE DECIDED TO TURN BACK AND PROCEED TO DXB.

XXXXX
Tbilisi to Dubai

Approx 1 hour prior to arriving in Dubai we were informed that a male passenger was suffering from a racing pulse, a condition for which he had seemingly been prescribed medication, but which he'd unfortunately left within his jacked pocked, the jacket having been placed within his checked-in baggage (it being now located in the #1 cargo hold).

A SatCom call was made to MedLink and the Doctors advice was for the gentlemen (and I kid you not) to purse his lips around his thumb and blow hard and / or to also effect a tensing of his stomach muscles (much as might occur during the act of defecation, I'm not making this stuff, up, as that's what the Doctor advised), actions which we were assured should help to quell the gentlemen's racing heart.

It transpired that a nurse was also onboard (albeit unfortunately without her formal ID), but she was nevertheless able to take the gentlemen pulse and also his blood pressure, all of which were alarmingly high. After a period of approx 15 minutes, during which the afore mentioned 'treatment' was enacted, the nurse again assessed the gentlemen's condition and it seemed that there had been little, if any, improvement. By this point we were in the descent in Dubai and it seemed that holding was likely at DESDI. So ATC were informed that we had sick passenger onboard and they asked if were we declaring an emergency? … and so, to avoid delay, a PAN call was made. UAE & Dubai Approach / Tower / Ground controllers were their usual superlative best, providing us with particular expeditious routing. Top class stuff! DNATA & FZ NCC were also contacted and advised that we had a sick passenger on board and a request was made for Paramedics to meet the aircraft, including a request for steps to be attached as soon as possible after our arrival on stand. All went swimmingly, that is until we arrived on stand only to then suffer a 2 minute delay, caused by no one from DNATA being available to drive the steps up to the aircraft. The gentlemen was eventually taken into the ambulance by the paramedics. We also recovered the gentlemen's suitcase from the #1 hold and were able to pass his medication to the paramedics.

461 IEV-DXB
Kiev to Dubai

Change of PIC with deadheading crew from IEV

During the flight back from IEV in the last hour of the flight Captain decided to use the lavatory. at this time Fo xxxxx was in the cockpit so he acted as the cover crew while Capt. Stepped out. after just few seconds the Lavatory door was fully opened and I could see partially in the camera that Capt. is sitting there surrounded by 4 cabin crew members. at this point I found out that he is not feeling well and I called the Cabin Crew Via Interphone to ask for further detail. she Informed me that he is suffering a low blood Pressure. after assessing the situation I decided to ask for the Dead heading Pic to enter the cockpit so we can continue with the safe operation. He entered the cockpit and Informed me that He saw Capt. was not in good condition. as a joint agreement the call was made to NCC via Satcom and the decision was made so Captain yyyyyy continue as the PIC to complete the Flight. after 15 minutes Capt. entered the cockpit and declared he feels better and he wanted to switch again with Capt. yyyyy but he was offered to relax more in the business class until we land in DXB.

466 IEV-DXB
Kiev to Dubai

FZxxx had an inflight declared Pilot Incapacitation as per the following sequence of events: 1. Flight was dispacthed with 2 sets of flight crew (4 pilots) and 1 set of Cabin crew (5 Flight attendants). 1 set of flight crew deadheading on 1° sector and operating on the way back and the other set vice versa. 2. FZxxx departed from IEV exercizing discrection due to delay on 1° sector and flight departed without issues.

3. During flight, Captain ate a sandwich (purchased in FZ cafeteria) and felt a different taste that was not strange enough to alarm him in order to stop from eating it

4. One and half hour after this, approximately after passing abeam KWI (more or less 1 hour to ARR in DXB), Captain left the cockpit to go to toilet for phisiological needs. 5. In the toilet, Captain felt nausea and little dizziness that last for about 2 min. Captain called Cabin crew in front galley to assist him with a glass of water and a little amount of salt, just in case it could be a low pressure peak. Cabin crew offered a chocolate in case of low sugar level and was also accepted by the Captain . 6. Cabin crew started their procedures questioning Captain to assess the situation. Captain aswered all the questions and never fainted or lost consciousness. Just rested seated with the head up to avoid vomiting. After 3 minutes, Captain was felling 100% again, but remained in the toilet resting for more 2 minutes. 7. During the time spent in toilet, operating FO saw through security camera the Cabin Crew assisting Captain and called the deadheading Captain to replace him in the cockpit. 8. Deadheading Captain took controls 9. Captain now was feeling 100%, yet a little pale in the face but recovering and wanted to return to duty. Cabin crew insisted in take the blood pressure measurement first, which was accepted. Also asked Capt if wanted Medlink to be called, which had a negative answer from Captain, as he was felling fully recovered. 10. Pressure was obtained (9/5) and Captain said that usually his blood pressure is normally on the lower side and that was normal for him and he felt OK to return to duty. 11. Cabin crew insisted that Captain to rest a little more in bussiness class seat for 5 minutes, since there was another Captain in the cockpit and we had time as we were far from ARR. Captain accepted the suggestion to rest further 5 min to make sure he was able to return to duty. 12. As all this time Captain felt better and fully recovered, he decided to return to cockpit. 13. Captain entered the cockpit and informed deadheading Captain that he was fully recovered and could return to his duty. 14. Deadheading Captain insisted in an informal way that Captain should not be worry and could rest in the back. Captain, then, insisted in returning to duty when was informed that a “decision has been made and NCC already swaped the Captains” 15. Captain accepted the decision and asked if he could stay in the observer seat from that moment onwards. Deadheahing Captain (in contols) agreeded and flight continued 16. During descent, it was informed that an ambulance was called upon arrival and Captain asked to cancell it, as he felt 100% and it was unnecessary in his opinion. Ambulance was canceled. 17. ATC asked if FZxxx wanted to call for emergency, but operating crew said “no” and flight continued uneventful till landing.

18. After landing Captain went upstairs to NCC to ask the reason for NCC decision to swap Captains, and only at that time Captain was informed that deadheading Captain had declared “Pilot Incapacitation” and NCC was only informed about the scenario. Because of that, NCC coordinated priority for landing for FZxxx 19. Captain returned downstairs and meet the crew for debriefing

20. Captain was initially removed from next duty and put on SICK till next morning meeting with Flight Operations Representatives

723 DXB
Dubai – not specified

During cruise the senior cabin crew called the flight deck and informed there was a lady on board not feeling well. She was 85 years old and experienced a shortness of breath and vomiting, senior informed us that he was going to call medlink . A few minutes later the senior came to the flight deck and informed us that the satcom mobile phone did not have a signal, so he explained the state the passenger was in and gave us the medlink form. I told him to go check on the passenger while I tried to contact medlink. It took a while to get hold of medlink, after the first contact the line got broken, on the third attempt we got a good connection with medlink.

Just before we were able to connect to medlink, the senior called us back and informed us that the passenger had stopped breathing and they could not find the pulse, so they had actioned CPR, the automated external defibrillator was showing no life, shock not recommended. They also had a doctor onboard which was assisting them. We shortly after got hold of MEDLINK and explained the situation, they advised us to continue to KHI while doing CPR, and said the doctor should give the adrenaline shot. All this was going on around in KHI FIR, around position LATEM, and we declared mayday and got highspeed and vectors into KHI. I was informed the crew performed CPR for approximately 45minutes, unfortunately the passenger could not be saved. The cabin crew did a very professional job and their teamwork was outstanding . We had a talk on the ground in KHI about the experience and how they were feeling, everyone was fit to fly home.

XXXXX
Dubai to Khartoum

this report is written in Colaboration eoth SCCM On flight 633 from DXB-KRT on AC A6-FEI, a xxxxx passenger seated in xxxxx complained to CCM about chest pain and shortness of breath and difficulty breathing at approx 0638z (1:38 hours onto the flight). The SCCM and CCMs found three doctors on board who then assisted in providing Oxygen and assistance to the passenger. Flight crew was informed of situation in a timely manner. SCCM then was to contact Medlink as per policies and procedures and get authorization as demanded by the doctors on board, whom stated at the xxxxx passenger was 'more than 85% chance of having a stroke'. The symptoms were once again shortness of breath, chest pain, no medications or previous medical history. If the SCCM and CCM did not help and allow access to the EMK he would take legal action and sue the crew and airline. Passenger was moved to J class third row. We informed the Doctor that we had to get clearance from Medlink to open and dispense any drugs in flight to the passenger. At this point the Captain made the call to Medlink via NCC as the hand help telephone was not working properly and hence the flight crew had to call from the flight deck. At approximately 0655z we contacted Medlink via phone patch (case # BMDC071174) with NCC and stated the above facts. In the meantime due to pressure and threats from the Doctor on board, the CCM gave a copy of the list of items in the Emergency fly away medical kit. The doctor said that he wanted to dispense item number 15- Nitrolingual spray 400 mcg to the patient.

We established the call with Medlink and were told that due to his age and no previous history, to give him two paracetamol tablets and continue the oxygen . The call was then dropped at 0703z. Called back at 0705z. At 0713z the Doctor then demanded to speak to me on the intercom. He stated that it was an 85% chance that the passenger was having a heart attack. I listened to him. He stated that if we did not take action that he would sue all of the crew and myself and the company as we were 'not doing anything to help the man'. I stated that we were all following company policy and procedures and needed to get clearance and medical advise from Medlink. It was my responsibility as the Captain to follow these procedures. He then continued to talk over me. I simply asked him if he would allow me to talk. I asked three times and then he hung up on me! I asked the SCCM to tell him that I simply needed the vital signs of the passenger so that I could then make another call to Medlink via NCC. He delayed this process by being rude and hanging up on the Captain . At 0722z we were updated with the vital signs (BP 130/85 and a pulse of 82) and was told that pain was increasing. At 0726z Medlink authorized the Crew to let the Doctor on board give one tablet/spray to the passenger and all if condition worsened. At 0732z we were informed by the SCCM and the Dr that medication was given and should be 'fine' in a few minutes. At 0740z passenger was 'fine' .

In range to KRT destination preventive medical assistance was requested from KRT tower. At 0857z we landed and were on blocks at 0902z. Medical personnel boarded and examined passenger, and stated he was fine and would further examine him at their facilities and request him to go see a medical doctor. He disembarked via high lift and then went with medical personnel in ambulance. He further argued with personnel on the ground. The assisting Dr________ left via the high lift with his elderly family member that had requested a wheel chair. Captain called Medlink and gave them update of above statement and added the fact at the passenger was overweight and not in shape for the record. NCC was also called and stated operation was n

Lasers
360 DXB-KHI
Dubai to Karachi

On final approach into KHI ILS 25L at 2nm from the runway on our left side approx 2nm away a bright white serach light was pointed at the aircraft and tracked us to the runway. It was intense enough to not look at directly. KHI ground comtrol was informed and they said they would take appropriate measures.

371 KWI-DXB
Kuwait to Dubai

On approach RW30L DXB a green laser light was shone at the aircraft from the left side. The area was identified as in the vicinity of Academic City. ATC advised.

398 DXB-KHI
Dubai to Karachi

Green laser light shone deliberately at our aircraft on the approach into Karachi. The issue was raised with ATC (Karachi Approach) who said they would investigate the matter further.

441 DXB-KHI
Dubai to Karachi

On final ILS25L in KHI, between 1500ft and 500ft AGL, a green laser pointed the cockpit several times. The position from which the beam flashed was approximately 3NM from IQA (ILS 109.7), 0.5NM left of RWY25L extended centerline. This information was reported to Karachi TWR. No further problems encountered.

522 DXB-TIF
Dubai to Taif

On approach to Taif almost intercepting the fila approach a Laser beam was pointed at the aircraft form a bi building all lit up by LED decorative lights. the laser did't enter the flight deck but was clealy pointed at the fuselage.

Birds and drones
380 ALA-DXB
Almaty, Kazakhstan, to Dubai

After T/O from DXB,we were flying the RIKET SID. When we passed 10000” we heard a loud impact sound from the left side of the fuselage. After this, we recognized it was a high altitude bird strike. We checked all the systems, engines parameters and the pressurization and we decided to continue our flight towards HYD and where we landed safely, uneventfully. On the stand we inspected the bird impact with my F/O and after that we called maintroll and techlog entry was taken. Maintroll dispatched the aircraft to home base. Return flight to DXB was uneventfull.

409 LKO-KTM
Chaudhary Charan Singh international airport, India, to Kathmandu, Nepal

Suspected Birdstrike on final approach at approx. 1.000 ft AGL. Approach continued. All parameters normal. Birdstrike inspection carried out after landing iaw AMM. NIL findings, no evidence of damage, engine core ingestion and no change in engine parameters. ADD raised for re-inspection at base DWC.

416 KDH-DXB
Kandahar, Afghanistan, to Dubai

We were in the short final at altitude 300ft agl when an unidentified bird hit the fuselage above windshield. No visible damage. Marked on the tech log.

426 KHI-DXB
Karachi to Dubai

Hit large raptor like bird on departure from rwy 25L in KHI . No parameter shift on indications. After landing large dent on no 1 engine Nacelle . Tech log entry made an main troll informed.

538 DXB-BEY
Dubai to Beirut

At approx 300' on approach runway 16 a flock of birds were seen flying across the approach path. An go-around/missed approach was initiated with the intent of avoiding flying through in the event of a continued landing. On initiation of the go-around at least one bird was hit , altitude approx 400'. During the missed approach, on level off with autopilot engaged the autopilot failed to capture the set altitude. A manual correction to this was made and. Autopilot reconnected. We were then told to plan ILS 17. We subsequently set up and flown as planned. However, when cleared to intercept, we failed to get a LLZ capture. We were quizzed by ATC, and told them we were correcting, only to have the same thing happen a second time. At this time we asked servicibility of the ground unit, to be told it was not active. We elected to break off the approach and requested to fly ILS16. A runway inspection was carried out, we planned and flew the approach with no further complications.

On inspection of aircraft after landing there was observed a considerably dent to the random right hand side . Inspection requested by approved personnel, and aircraft was deemed AOG.

541 DAC-DXB
Dhaka to Dubai

During takeoff from RW14 in DAC after V1 during rotation we experienced a bird strike on ENG #1. Heavy smell of burned bird felt in the cockpit and during climb engine vibration was experienced up to 3.8. High engine vibration NNC performed and thrust reduced to to minimum acceptable. Vibration always kept below 3.0 during the rest of the flight. NCC was contacted and decition to continue to Dubai was made. CC informed and NITS briefing performed. Safe continuation of the flight and safe landing performed in DXB.

591 DYU-DXB
Dushanbe, Tajikistan, to Dubai

At liftoff from RW09 a white object was seen passing the left window and shortly after a smell of cooking. A bird strike was suspected and engine parameters regularly observed during the climb. All was normal and the flight continued to DXB without event. The tower at DYU were informed of a suspected bird strike and a tech log entry made on arrival in DXB.

444 KDH-DXB
Kandahar to Dubai

a drone flying straight and level was observed flying parallel to runway 30L in dubai at 3 miles on final segment to the left side, 1000 feet height, lateral separation around 100 meters from the airplane; surroundings of mirdiff. ATC was informed and aircraft performed a normal approach besides that.

630 DXB-DYU
Dubai to Dushanbe

On final approach to Rwy 09 (radar vectors) we heard a quite distinct noise in the flight deck. On PDI we found trace of a confirmed bird strike on the radome and we suspected bird ingestion by the right engine . We didn't see any changes on the engine parameters nor smell any funny burnt odor form the conditioning system. The suspect was due some trace that could not be properly identified on the engine cowl and on one of the fan blades during the PDI. Picture were taken and sent to maintrol. They organized the assistance of a qualified engineer that performed a thorough inspection to the aircraft and signed of the aircraft with a one off authorization.

659 HGA-DXB
Hargeisa, Somalia, to Dubai

BIRDS OBSERVED ON BACK TRACK FROM HGA. REQUESTED BIRD SCARING PRIOR TO DEPARTURE FROM RW06. BIRDS STILL OBSERVED TOWARDS THRESHOLD OF RW24 AND BELIEVED WE HAD A STRIKE ONCE AIRBORNE. IMMEDIATE SMELL OF BURNT MEAT AND NUMBER 1 ENGINE SHOWED VIBRATION OF UP TO 1.5 UNITS. ALL OTHER PARAMETERS NORMAL SO FLIGHT CONTINUED TO DUBAI. THIS WAS CONFIRMED BY INSPECTION IN DUBAI AND BIRD STRIKE CONFIRMED ON THE NUMBER 1 ENGINE WITH DAMAGE FOUND TO THE NUMBER 12 N1 BLADE WITH POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO OTHERS. BIRD PARTS SEEN IN INLET AND EXHAUST AREA OF ENGINE. UNABLE TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE .

Disruptive behaviour

363 VCBI-OMDB

Colombo to Dubai

Just after pushing back from the stand and as we were about to start engines, the SCCM called from the cabin and informed us that a passenger is shouting at the cabin crew very loudly and appears to be heavily drunk.

I immediately got the push back stopped and got the aircraft pulled back into the stand in coordination with Colombo ground .

I asked for immediate presence of Police at the gate. The passenger was escorted out of the aircraft by police and his hand baggage plus his checked baggage removed from the cargo hold. I ordered a new and complete safety and security check of the aircraft by the cabin crew along with identification of each hand bag by individual passengers. After the completion of security procedures the flight was commenced and completed without any further disruption.

NOTE: I was told by senior on return to Dubai was that the cabin crew did notice this passenger being drunk while boarding but they did not bother informing the captain. Please investigate that why such an obvious drunk passenger got through the check in gate and then into the aircraft?? The cabin crew must be advised to be vary of such passengers and they MUST bring any unusual happening to the notice of captain in time. This disruption could have been avoided by efficient checking at gate and/ or at least while boarding.

449 DXB-JED
Dubai to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia

Go Around at aprox 2000 due to cabin no longer being secure.

Pax got up and went to the toilet, was repeatedly asked to return to seat as we were about to land, and chose to ignore all instructions from cabin crew and general PA made bt me from the flight deck Go around was carried out after confirming with cabin crew cabin was no longer secure. Resequenced and carried out subsequent approach to land with no further issues. Security was requested to meet the aircraft on stand, and passenger was dealt with by them.

382 URKK-OMBD
Krasnodar to Dubai

The flight was Initially delayed out of Dubai due to boarding and ATC. Managed to get a few short cuts and arrived in to KRR [Krasnodar] a few minutes early. Aircraft was refuelled and inspected within 20 minutes of arriving, it was noted that the aircraft's wings would need de-icing due to cold soak fuel frost. FZ ground staff at KRR informed the captain of 1 inadmissible passenger, told they would take approximately 10 minutes to process and would then be sent out to the aircraft, at this stage this did not appear warrant any concern of delaying the flight. The 1 inadmissible passenger then became 2 and finally 4. It was quite apparent that the initial 10 minute estimate was wildly inaccurate and that the flight would be heavily delayed waiting for the passengers.

During the delay 2 female passengers called CCM via the crew call button, they complained about the multi-cultural mix of the crew and said 'why aren't there more Russian crew on the flight?' The crew member asked the passengers to behave, they were clearly drunk and didn't listen. The passengers then called CCM and verbally (racially) abused her, telling her to @#$%^& .

Truffles/brakes/turbulence/dogs
362 OIKB-OMDB
Bandar Abbas, Iran, to Dubai

While taking off from OIKB significantly more elevator was required to unstick the nose for rotation than is normally needed. Once rotation was achieved, the yoke felt very heavy and I (FO) used stabilizer trim to ease the elevator force. Once my flaps were up the trim indicated 10.3 units of nose up trim. During the rotation, the yoke travel felt very close to full travel to achieve the proper rotation rate. I gave control to the captain so he could evaluate the situation and he agreed that there was a serious imbalance in the aircraft. The flight controls felt normal and it was determined that it must be an issue with the cargo load . Other than the abnormal trim required the aircraft flew normally and we continued to DXB.

The Loadsheet indicated there were 3400 Kg of Truffles loaded. 600 kg in C2 and 2800 kg in C3 with 24 bags in C4. The picture attached shows where all the cargo and bags were located in the aft pit. It does not look like there was 2800 kg of truffles in C3. and the bags were not secured in C4. This condition may have led to the nose heavy CG . The forward pit was pretty close to being bulked out so I did not include a picture. After landing we contacted NCC and asked that someone come out and verify the load. In the Picture attached of C3 there was no cargo or bags aft of what you see in the picture.

393 DXB-JUB
Dubai to Juba, South Sudan

Marshalling at Juba

After landing, we backtracked and vacated runway 13 via taxiway C. Marshaller was insight and i taxied the airplane to position for parking in accordance with marshaller guidance.

As i approached the parking area i noticed that the marshaller is guiding us onto a parking position that would cause us to maneuver the airplane outside protected area and expose part of the port wing outboard of engine #1 to rest over active service road in front of fire station. I could not accept parking in the position given by the marshaller because due to the following reasons: (Please refer to attached photos in pdf) 1. Port wing would be resting over active service road used by vehicles and equipment (risk of collision) 2. Very tight maneuvering will be required to taxi out of the given parking position for the next crew and movement over unprotected surface will be involved (wingtip clearance during the turn) 3. Close proximity to fire station which in case of any required emergency movement can cause difficulty for fire trucks movement (restricted paved surface). Both myself and the First Officer requested the marshaller several times using hand signals to move slightly inwards into the apron but he insisted that we should taxy towards his position.

After trying for about 5 minutes with him without success i requested in coordination with ATC to turn and park at current position, taking into consideration that we would not be blocking any aircraft or personnel movements or cause any issues to other aircrafts or ATC After shutdown i requested to speak with the marshaller. When i met him he was upset and did not even want to listen to my explanation commenting stuff like “he is in charge” and i should follow his marshaling instructions “without asking or questioning” and that “when i am in Juba i should follow his rule” . He claimed that we blocked other aircraft which was certainly not the case as movement on the apron went on as normal including large Antonov aircraft movement.

Since the conversation was not going anywhere i informed him that i will be filing an ASR detailing the incident. I would also like to reiterate that the same issue occurred on my previous flight to Juba but the marshaller at the time was more cooperative allowing us to park as requested. Incidentally: When i was trying to take photos of the parking position of Flydubai aircraft I was stopped by security saying that i am not allowed to take any photos and i will be risking detention if i do so again. I hope the above report can contribute to safer operation at Juba airport

DXB-ELQ
Dubai to Gassim, Saudi Arabia

Pilot flying forgot to release the parking brake for takeoff. Config warning sounded, brakes released, normal takeoff followed.

442 MCT-DXB
Buraidah, Saudi Arabia, to Dubai

Qatar Airways refuelling during thunderstorm

Qatar airways A320 parked next to our plane was refuelled during a thunderstorm with lightning over the airfield. I was waiting for the storms to pass but the Qatar plane didnt. When I questioned the captain his response was he just needed a quick 500kg, thinking that it would be ok . The fuel company al maha when questioned said that the captain had requested it so they had to do it. I felt this was a very unsafe thing to do and they had no real understanding of the potential implications of the situation. I delayed over 45 minutes before myself and the first officer felt it was safe to refuel our plane .

465 DWC-DXB
Dubai World Central to Dubai

Hi Kind of a bad approach in KTM yesterday . It started out by ATC wanting us to do a VOR to rwy 02. Wind was reported 190/17 kts. We can only do 10 kts tail wind in ktm. We asked for a circling, but with the option to land on RWY 02 when we came down to minima and the wind was below 10 kts. On final KTM wanted us to circle to the right of the rwy, we several times told them that we can only do circling to the left of the rwy. So busy on the radio, coming down the path. We did turn left at KTM 2 miles, hdg 337 for 20 sec, then hdg 022, abm the threshold timing was done at 10 sec (not 15, due to tailwind), we had to stay within the 4 nm circle of KTM. I started descend, disconnected AP/AT and continued descend. We had one bank angle and 2 sink rate aural warnings. We were fully VMC so I continued. The approach leaves you 3 times high than a normal 3deg. ILS app. At one mile from the rwy on the circling app you are at 800 somthing feet, on a normal ILS you would be at 300 feet. On the VOR to 02 KTM we do get glideslope warning the last 2.5 nm if we increase our rate of descent, and thats normal in KTM. Now I could see that we where high, but was not expecting to have that steep angle to the rwy. So rate of descent was high , and triggered the aural sink rate twice. I don't see how that app can be flown without getting the warning or at least close to getting it. Its steep, its close to the mountains, and its an approach I have only done once in the sim 4-5 years ago. I was not comfortable doing it . A sink rate warning can be disregarded if you are VMC and comfortable to continue, but we did get it close 300 feet also. This really bugs me, either is was late starting my descent, we where to close or something else. We should probably have done a go around, but that would have ended up in a diversion and a layover somewhere. (I know thats not an excuse, but its still in your mind somewhere when making your split second decision) Its a complex situation and you know you will get yelled at from the company if that would be the case. I would like your response to the incident and your thoughts on that app, am I the only one with this view or has other people raised their concern etc. Next time the offer a circling to RWY 20 I will probably decline, and rather diverte. Its not worth it..

480 DXB-BGW
Dubai to Baghdad

ASR ATC Baghdad Wind 130/12 vis 10k m Baghdad ATC AND tower

We asked for runway 33R but our request were denied. We asked for the reason why we could not land 33R and ATC replied due to tailwind. We inform them that the current wind was 10kts tail wind and that we can accept up to 15kt tailwind. The ATC asked us why we are forcing to land in bad weather and that they know about our accident and they are worried for us . When we finally got ILS 33R the tower switched off the ILS and told us we have to land runway 15L because the ILS is not available. We then asked for the VOR 33R it was approved but later on the tower turn the ILS back on again and told us that the ILS is now available, however we reclined and continued the VOR approach for runway 33R. The workload became high since the Tower denied our request and kept disturbing us with different type of clearances. Also the statement from ATC that the knew about a our accident and they were worried for us made both me and the FO very uncomfortable to the point we started to get worried about the approach .

489 DXB-KWI
Dubai to Kuwait

Severe turbulence encounter during descent

During descent to Kuwait and at FL300 between positions SOLEM and KUMBO we encountered severe turbulence for duration of approximately 1 minute, the instruments were completely unreadable. During the entire flight we had encountered moderate turbulence en-route due to weather and Jetstream presence. Supplementary procedure for Turbulence was applied and request for descent made to Bahrain, passing through FL250 the turbulence subsided. Tech log entry was made, refer FDR02323 and MCC organized maintenance inspection by external engineer from NAS in Kuwait. Thorough inspection was made and aircraft was cleared. Nothing further to report

511 VKO-DXB
Moscow, Russia, to Dubai

Severe Clear Air Turbulence

While cruising at FL370 over Iranian airspace , approximately near to waypoint GODNA, in clear VMC, no weather radar return ahead and nearby, a rapid onset of severe turbulence occurred from steady flight condition with abrupt increase in airspeed quickly towards MMO, and pitch up onset estimated up to 10 degrees. I was PF (Captain), i disconnect A/P and A/T; due to severe turbulence and extreme bumping no mode control panel selection was possible to engage so i disregarded F/D inputs left on VNAV PATH. Expeditious pitch attitude and thrust correction where made to try to remain within flight envelope.

Aircraft was uncontrollable at time for 10-15 seconds every now and then. Total duration probably around one and half minute . Request descend to lower level cause not possible to keep altitude and difficult control on roll as well. Seat belt sign was turned ON as the onset occurred.

After around 1 and half minutes able to regain complete control of aircraft and level at FL350. At the onset of the severe turbulence we were flying at FL370, while the OFP was planned at FL390 and at that moment the MAX cruise level reported by the FMC was FL395 due buffet limitation. On top of that we choose to keep a lower cruise speed of Mach .78 compared to the ECON suggested by the FMC of .789. No report of turbulence was received and encountered and shear on OFP was showing 3 to 1, while wind was steady at around 270/85k. Plane didn't went in MMO (no clacker sounded) and remain at time sligltly above lower amber band, but was very difficult to control around all axis with abrupt speed variations of +- 20 kts and excursion of pitch up and down of more than +-5 degrees. Speedbrake use momentary not to exceed MMO. PM did a very good support calling all deviations and coordinating with ATC. No nearby aircarft was flying at the moment. With aircraft now under control, an assessment was done, A/P and A/T engaged and cruise speed of mach .76 selected. Cabin crew were contacted to assess their situation as well as the passengers.

Nobody was hurt but scare was among passenger. I made a PA to reassure the passengers explaining that the situation was under control. Rest of the flight went uneventful . Tech log entry for severe turbulence made upon arriving in DXB and maintroll advised. ATC advised later other aircrafts about the CAT.

523 OMDB-OAKB
Dubai to Kabul

Lost comms into Afghanistan

All flights into and out of Afghani airspace constantly fly without being in communication with the relevant station. Speaking to an air traffic controller working for Kabul approach who happened to be on our flight, this has been an issue for a long time and is due to some transmitters being out of fuel . See NOTAM A142/16 and A228/16. A simple refueling of these booster stations would prevent any incident where an aircraft might be out of radio-range and has a problem which requires immediate assistance . Consider the high terrain in the area. Problems persist on the GADER-OGOGO route portion and the LAJAK-GIDOG route portion.

There must be an easy solution would could avert a possible accident.

625 MHD-DXB
Mashhad, Iran, to Dubai

pack of 5 big dogs at taxiway b just after the main apron in mashad airport, we have informed the tower, which told us the dogs were not going to be a threat for our airplane and that a runway inspection was just carried out and runway was clear; i think they might have trained the dogs not to move while airplanes are in movement at that location! There is a fence in the perimeter of the airdrome, and i believe the dogs are tenants there. Yes, it is a joke; to receive such communication from the tower, never assuring that the animals were going to be removed from there.

654 DXB-SKT
Dubai to Sialkot, Pakistan

Whilst doing my welcome on board PA with the aircraft almost ready to depart, a passenger approached the cabin crew and asked why the Captain announced he was going to SKT and not Karachi as per his ticket. Passenger ticket indeed confirmed a booking for FZ331 to Karachi on the same day. FZ331 leaves 15 minutes after FZ337 to SKT. flydubai ground staff, NCC and police informed and the passenger was offloaded together with his 2 checked in bags. Cabin crew asked to search around the area where the passenger was seated and identify the hand baggage in the area's overhead lockers. Flight took another 30 minutes delay as a result of this. The passenger explained that he bought the ticket last minute at the flydubai reservations desk in T2.

668 ODS-DXB
Odessa, Ukraine, to Dubai

While refueling the aircraft, I noticed 6 large wooden boxes being loaded into Compartment 3. Each box took 4-5 big men to lift it. After fueling I checked the hold & found that all boxes had been grouped together at the front of the compartment and were not evenly distributed. Even more worryingly, none of these boxes were fastened to the aircraft. I asked for them to be lashed down, and on checking found a man tying a rope around the group of boxes, but still no netting or other equipment to contain the load! The effect of this load moving in the climb out or in flight doesn't bear thinking about!!!

399 DXB-TIF
Dubai to Taif

Accidentally entered Saudi airspace without communication

Accidentally entered Saudi airspace without communication. Contributing Factors: Busy avoiding weather before FIR entry. Missed frequency change from Bah 127.525 (not sure if occured). Both myself and FO believed we were in contact with Jeddah but actually we had not checked inFinally heard Jeddah 133.800 call us on guard. Checked in and immediately apologised regarding the confusion. On the return 878 we contacted Jeddah and he stated that everthing was fine.

414 DXB-OAI
Dubai to Bagram, Afghanistan

Drifting slightly into Iranian airspace to avoid weather

When we were approaching reporting point NADSO on airway B505, we had thunderstorm cells overhead NADSO and the south side of our route at flight level 290. We requested a higher level to avoid this weather, but it was not possible due to traffic. We knew that Iranian airspace was quite close to the airway from looking at our route charts (we were flying with aircraft A6-FDT which has no installed ipads) and that point, the only way we could avoid flying into a very bad thunder storm cell, was to turn north. We got approval from muscat to avoid weather and head northbound.

We did our best to estimate the EXACT location of the Iranian boundary from observing the route chart, and attempted to stay as close as possible to the correct airway and at the same time maintain safe flying conditions.

Immediately after passing this thunder storm cell, we measured the distance on the route map with a plotter and became aware that we had been in Iranian airspace maximum 5 miles. We also confirmed the same with Muscat control. Tehran air-defense or control did not call us on 121.5 frequency at any time.

No further actions were made in this case.

Share This Post